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This paper quanties the importance of news shocks for housing market uctuations. To
this purpose, we extend Iacoviello and Neri (2010)s model of the housing market to include
news shocks and estimate it using Bayesian methods and U.S. data. We nd that news shocks:
(1) account for a sizable fraction of the variability in house prices and other macroeconomic
variables over the business cycle and (2) signicantly contributed to booms and busts episodes
in house prices over the last three decades. By linking news shocks to agentsexpectations, we
nd that house price growth was positively related to ination expectations during the boom of
the late 1970s while it was negatively related to interest rate expectations during the housing
boom that peaked in the mid-2000s.
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How important are expectation-driven cycles for housing market dynamics? Survey evidence shows
that house price dynamics are signicantly related to macroeconomic expectations and particularly
to optimism about future house prices appreciation.1 However, macroeconomic models of the
housing market mainly rely on fundamental developments in the economy to explain uctuations
in house prices and residential investment. Among others, Davis and Heathcote (2005) develop a
multi-sector model of the housing market that matches the co-movement of residential investment
with GDP and other components of GDP by assuming technology shocks as the only source of
uctuations; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) add real, nominal, and credit frictions, along with a larger
set of shocks, to the multi-sector framework and highlight the role of housing preference shock,
technology and monetary factors.2
This paper evaluates the empirical importance of expectations-driven cycles for housing market
uctuations. In particular, following most of the literature on expectations-driven cycles, we explore
the importance of news shocks as relevant sources of uncertainty.3 To this purpose we estimate
Iacoviello and Neri (2010)s model extended to incorporate news over di¤erent time horizons about
the structural shocks of the model. The framework we use is particularly relevant to the purpose
of this paper since its rich modelling structure allows for the quantifying of news shocks originated
in di¤erent sectors of the economy, e.g., the housing market, the production sector, inationary
factors and the conduct of monetary policy. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), we assume that
the structural shocks of the model feature a standard unanticipated component and an anticipated
component driven by innovations announced 4 and 8 quarters in advance. Thus, the innovation
announced 4 quarters in advance can be views as a revision of the innovation announced 8 quarters in
advance and the current innovation can be interpreted as a revision to the sum of the anticipated
innovations. To quantify the empirical relevance of news shocks, we t the model to U.S. data
using likelihood-based Bayesian methods. As highlighted by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), it is
feasible to identify and estimate news shocks by using DSGE models with forward looking agents
and likelihood-based methods.
This paper provides several insightful results. First, the model that allows for news shocks is
1 In particular, Case and Shiller (2003) document that expectations of future house price increases had a role in
past housing booms in the U.S.; Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers to
show that during the boom that peaked in the mid-2000s, expectations of rising house prices signicantly increased;
Nofsinger (2011) argues that the emotions and psychological biases of households play an important role in economic
booms.
2For other papers of the housing market, see, among others, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004), Iacoviello
(2005), Finocchiaro and Queijo von Heideken (2009), Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2010), Liu, Zha and Wang
(2011).
3See, among others, Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), Floden (2007), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno
(2008), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012).
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strongly preferred in terms of overall goodness of t. In particular, the data favor the inclusion of
news shocks over a longer time-horizon, i.e. 8 quarters in advance. Further, on the bases of local
identication analysis as in Iskrev (2010a, 2010b), we argue that news shocks are neither "nearly
irrelevant", i.e. do not a¤ect the solution of the model or the model implied moments, or "nearly
redundant", i.e. their e¤ect can be replicated by other shocks. News shocks are distinguishable from
unanticipated shocks in terms of the solution of the model and are also important in determining the
statistical properties of the model. Indeed, news shocks a¤ect economic choices and, in particular,
the housing and credit decisions of households di¤erently than unanticipated shocks.
Second, news shocks explain around 40 percent of business cycle uctuations in house prices
and a sizable fraction of variations in consumption, residential and non-residential investment. In
particular, expectations about future cost-push shocks are the largest contributors to business cycle
uctuations. Among other news shocks, news related to productivity explains almost one-quarter of
the variability in business investment. News shocks related to monetary factors account for a larger
fraction of variations in house prices and consumption than expectations about future productivity
shocks. A plausible reason for the importance of news shocks is related to the fact that these shocks
generate the co-movement among business investment, consumption and house prices observed in
the data, especially during periods of housing booms.
Third, news shocks contribute to the boom-phases in house prices, whereas the busts are al-
most entirely the result of unanticipated monetary policy and productivity shocks. In particular,
expectations of cost-push shocks are found to be important for the run up in house prices and
residential investment during the housing booms that occurred concurrently with the energy crises
of the 1970s. Investment specic news shocks are the main contributor to residential investment
growth during the "new economy" cycle of the late 1990s. Expectations of housing productivity
shocks and investment specic shocks somewhat contribute to changes in house prices during the
latest boom, whereas expected downward cost pressures on ination muted its increase over the
same period.
Last, exploring the linkage between news shocks and expectations, we nd that the model is
successful in matching the dynamics of the survey-based ination and interest rate expectations and
the co-movement of these expectations with house prices. Under the assumption of debt contracts
in nominal terms, changes in the expected real rates a¤ect households borrowing and investment
decisions. Thus, the model suggests an important role of ination or interest rates expectations for
movements in house prices. We show that news shocks account for a large fraction of variation in
the model-generated expectations: ination expectations are mainly related to news on the cost-
push shock, while a large part of variations in interest rate expectations is explained by news on the
shock to the target of the central bank and on the investment-specic shock. The importance of
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the latter shock is plausibly related to the GDP growth component of the interest-rate rule followed
by the monetary authority.
Further, using survey-based expectations on ination and interest rates, we also test the plaus-
ibility of the expectation channel featured by the model. On the base of Granger causality tests we
nd that news shocks also contain statistically signicant information for survey-based ination and
interest rate expectations. As a result, the model mimics particularly well the evidence that higher
ination expectations are strongly related to house prices during the boom of the 1970s whereas
lower interest rate expectations are signicantly related to the run up in house prices during the
latest boom. The link between interest rate expectations and house prices over the last decade
seems to be mainly driven by the systematic component of the policy rule, and, in particular, by
expectations about GDP growth as opposed to news on monetary policy shocks.
This paper is related to the growing empirical literature that explores the role of news shocks
over the business cycle. Beaudry and Portier (2006) using a VAR approach showed that business
cycle uctuations in the data are primarily driven by changes in agentsexpectations about future
technological growth. Since their seminal paper, several authors have investigated the importance
of expectations-driven cycles as a source of business cycle uctuations.4 This paper is particularly
related to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) that estimating a real business cycle model, docu-
ment that news on future neutral productivity shocks, investment-specic shocks, and government
spending shocks account for more than two thirds of predicted aggregate uctuations in postwar
U.S. data. We contribute to their ndings by documenting that news shocks are also important
for housing market uctuations. Moreover, di¤erently from previous papers, we assess the relat-
ive importance of the unanticipated and anticipated component of the shocks in a¤ecting both the
structural and statistical properties of the model. Further, we also explore the linkage between news
shocks and the endogenous expectations of the model and document how expectations on ination
and interest rates are related to house price booms and busts.5 To the best of our knowledge, there
are no other attempts to quantify the role of news shocks for housing market uctuations in this
strand of the business cycle literature.
Few other authors have also studied the transmission mechanism of expectations on future
4Among others, see, Barsky and Sims (2009), Kurmann and Otrok (2009), Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani (2011),
Khan and Tsoukalas (2009), Milani and Treadwell (2009), Badarinza and Margaritov (2011).
5Very few papers analyze the ability of DSGE models to match the dynamics of expectations. These other studies
mainly focus on how alternative assumptions regarding agentsinformation about the central banks ination target
help to match ination expectations. In particular, Schorfheide (2005) estimates on U.S. data two versions of a DSGE,
featuring either full information or learning regarding the target ination rate, and shows that, during the period
1982-1985, ination expectations calculated from the learning model track the survey forecasts more accurately than
the full-information forecasts; Del Negro and Eusepi (2010) using ination expectations as an observable show that
when agents have perfect information about the value of the policymakers ination target model helps to better t
the dynamics of ination expectations.
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fundamentals to house prices in macro models. Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) show that
changes in expectations of future macroeconomic developments can generate empirically plausible
boom-bust cycles in the housing market; Tomura (2010) documents that uncertainty about the
duration of a period of temporary high income growth can generate housing booms in an open
economy model; Adam, Kuang and Marcet (2011) explain the joint dynamics of house prices and
the current account over the years 2001-2008 by relying on a model of "internally rational" agents
that form beliefs about how house prices relate to economic fundamentals; Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011) document that heterogeneous beliefs about long-run fundamentals can lead
to booms and busts in the housing market. We complement previous ndings by providing a
quantitative assessment of the importance of expectation-driven cycles for housing prices and by
documenting the type of news shocks that are more relevant in driving housing market uctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and Section 3
describes the estimation methodology. Section 4 tests for local identication of the shocks. Section
5 comments on the results of news shocks as a source of uctuations in the housing market and
Section 6 investigates the role of news shocks for booms and busts in house prices and residential
investment. Section 7 relates agentsexpectations to house prices. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We rely on the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The model
features real, nominal, and nancial frictions, as well as a large set of shocks. Three sectors of
production are assumed: a non-durable goods sector, a non-residential investment sector, and a
residential sector. Households di¤er in terms of their discount factor and gain utility from non-
durable consumption, leisure, and housing services. In addition, housing can be used as collateral
for loans. For completeness, we describe the main features of the model in the next subsections.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of two types: patient and impatient.
Impatient households discount the future at a higher rate than patient households. Thus, in
equilibrium, impatient households are net borrowers while patient households are net lenders. We,
henceforth, interchangeably refer to patient and impatient households as Lenders and Borrowers,
respectively. Discount factor heterogeneity generates credit ows between agents. This feature was
originally introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended to a model of
the housing market by Iacoviello (2005). Both types of households consume, work in two sectors,
namely in the non-durable goods sector and the housing sector, and accumulate housing.
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where  is the discount factor (0 < 0 <  < 1), " is the external habits parameter (0 < " < 1), 
is the inverse of the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to the real wage ( > 0), and  denes the
degree of substitution between hours worked in the two sectors (  0). GC is the trend growth
rate of real consumption and  c is a scaling factor of the marginal utility of consumption. zt, jt and
 t are shocks to the intertemporal preferences, housing demand and labor supply, respectively, that
follow AR(1) processes. Lenders decide how much to consume, ct, the amount of hours devoted
to work in each sector, nc;t and nh;t, the accumulation of housing ht (priced at qt), the supply of
intermediate inputs kb;t (priced at pb;t), the stock of land lt (that is priced at pl;t), and the stock
of capital used in the two sectors of production, kc;t and kh;t. Lenders also choose the capital
utilization rate in each sector, zc;t and zh;t (subject to a convex cost a ()). Finally, they decide
on the amount of lending, bt. Loans yield a riskless (gross) nominal interest rate denoted by Rt.
On the other hand, Lenders receive wage income (wc;t and wh;t are the real wages in each sector,
relative to the consumption good price), income from renting capital (at the real rental rates Rc;t
and Rh;t) and land (at the real rental rate Rl;t), and from supplying intermediate goods to rms.
Capital in the non-durable goods sector and in the housing sector as well as land depreciate at
(quarterly) rates kc, kh and h. Finally, Lenders receive (lump-sum) dividends from owning rms





















  c;t   h;t  
a (zc;t) kc;t 1
Ak;t
  a (zh;t) kh;t 1;
where t is the (quarter-on-quarter) ination rate in the consumption goods sector. Ak;t is an
investment-specic technology shock that represents the marginal cost of producing consumption
good sector specic capital.6 GIKc and GIKhare the trend growth rates of capital used in the two
6This follows the same process as productivity in the non-durable goods and housing sectors, see Section 2.2.
6
sectors of production and c;t and h;t are convex adjustment costs for capital.
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Both types of households supply labor to unions in the two sectors of production. The unions
di¤erentiate labor services and sell it in a monopolistic competitive labor market. Thus, there is
a wedge between the wage paid by rms to labor unions and those received by households (Xwc;t
and Xwh;t denote the markups in the non-durable and housing sectors, respectively). Wages are
set according to a Calvo (1983) scheme (with a 1   w;c exogenous probability of re-optimization
when labor is supplied to the non-durable goods sector union and a 1   w;h is the probability in
the housing sector) with partial indexation to past ination (with parameters w;c and w;h in the
corresponding sectors).
Borrowers Borrowers and Lenders utility function are similarly dened.8 Borrowers do not
own capital, land or rms. They only receive dividends from labor unions. Hence, the borrowers





































Borrowers are constrained in that they may only borrow up to a fraction of the expected present











where m  1 represents the loan-to-value ratio.9
2.2 Firms
Non-durable goods, business capital and housing are produced by a continuum of wholesale rms


















kh;t 1 is the housing-sector capital adjustment cost; AK represents the long-run net growth
rate of technology in business capital, kc and kh are the coe¢ cients for adjustment cost (i.e., the relative prices of
installing the existing capital) for capital used in the consumption sector and housing sector, respectively.
8Variables and parameters with a prime ( 0 ) refer to Borrowers while those without a prime refer to Lenders.
9Given the assumed di¤erence in the discount factor, the borrowing restriction holds with equality in the steady
state. As common in the literature, we solve the model assuming that the constraint is also binding in a neighbourhood
of the steady state. See, among others, Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Minetti
(2006), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Sterk (2010).
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retail sale prices of housing are assumed to be exible.
Wholesale rms Wholesale rms operate in a perfect competition exible price market and
produce both non-durable goods, Yt, and new houses, IHt. To produce non-durable goods the
wholesale rms use labor (supplied by both types of households) and capital as inputs of production
while the producers of new houses also use intermediate goods and land. Production technologies



























where  is a parameter that measures the labor income share of Lenders and Ah;t and Ac;t are
the productivity shocks to the non-durable goods sector and housing sector, respectively. The
productivity shocks are dened as:10
ln(Ax;t) = t ln(1 + Ax) + ln(Zx;t); x = c; h
where ln(Zc;t) and ln(Zh;t) follow AR(1) processes (with serially uncorrelated, zero mean innovations
with standard-deviations Ac and Ah) and Ac and Ah are the long-run net growth rates of
technology in each sector, such that:
ln(Zx;t) = Ax ln(Zx;t 1) + ux;t:
Retailers Wholesale rms in the non-durable goods sector sell their output under perfect com-
petition to retailers that act under monopolistic competition when selling the goods to households.
Retailers di¤erentiate the non-durable goods and then sell them to households, charging a markup,
Xt, over the wholesale price. Retailers set their prices under a Calvo-type mechanism (the exo-
genous probability of re-optimization is equal to 1   ) with partial indexation to past ination
(driven by parameter ). This setup leads to the following forward-looking Phillips curve:







and up;t is an i.i.d. cost-push shock.
10The investment-specic technology shock, Ak;t, is similarly dened.
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2.3 Monetary Policy Authority














where rr is the steady-state real interest rate, GDP is the economys gross domestic product, uR;t
is an i.i.d. shock and As;t is a persistent shock to the central banks ination target. Following
Iacoviello and Neri (2009), GDP is dened as the sum of consumption and investment at constant
prices GDPt = Ct + IKt + qIHt, where q is real housing prices along the balanced growth path in
terms of the price of the consumption good.
2.4 News Shocks
In the model there are seven AR(1) shocks  zt, jt,  t, Ah;t, Ac;t, Ak;t and As;t and two i.i.d.
shocks: up;t and uR;t. Expectations of future macroeconomic developments are introduced as in the
existing news shock literature. We assume that the error term of the shocks, with the exception of
preferences ,ux;t, consists of an unanticipated component, "0x;t; and anticipated changes n quarters








where "x;t is i.i.d and x = fc; h; k; p;R; sg. Thus, at time t  n agents receive a signal about future
macroeconomic conditions at time t: As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) we assume anticip-
ated changes four and eight quarters ahead. This assumption allows for revisions in expectations,
e.g., "8x;t 8can be revised at time t   4 (up or down, partially or completely, in the latter case
"4x;t 4 =  "8x;t 8) and "4x;t 4+ "8x;t 8 can be revised at time 0 (again, partially or completely, in the
latter case "0x;t =  ("4x;t 4 + "8x;t 8) and ux;t = 0).
3 Estimation
In this section, we describe both the estimation methodology and the data used. We also briey




The set of structural parameters of the model describing technology, adjustment costs, price and
wage rigidities, the monetary policy rule, and the shocks is estimated using Bayesian techniques.
We proceed in two steps. First, we obtain the mode of the posterior distribution which summarizes
information about the likelihood of the data and the priors on the parametersdistributions by
numerically maximizing the log of the posterior. We then approximate the inverse of the Hes-
sian matrix evaluated at the mode. We subsequently use the random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to simulate the posterior, where the covariance matrix of the proposal distribution is
proportional to the inverse Hessian at the posterior mode computed in the rst step. After check-
ing for convergence, we perform statistical inference on the models parameters or functions of
the parameters, such as second moments.11 For recent surveys of Bayesian methods, see An and
Schorfheide (2007) and Fernandéz-Villaverde (2010).
In setting the parametersprior distributions, we follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In particular,
we use a beta distribution for the serial correlations of the shocks, Ax, and an inverse gamma
distribution for the standard deviations of the shocks, x. In order to avoid over-weighting a
priori any of the two components of the shocks, we assume that the variance of the unanticipated













Introducing news shocks to the model adds 12 additional parameters. In order to make the
estimation less cumbersome, we reduce the set of parameters by calibrating those that a¤ect the
steady state of the model. Most of these parameters are calibrated as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
while others are set to the mean estimated values reported in their estimates. Thus, as in most
estimated DSGE models, the steady-state ratios are unchanged during the estimation. As common
in the literature, we also x the autoregressive parameters of the ination targeting shock.13 See
Table 1.
3.2 Data
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we consider ten observables: real consumption per capita, real
private business and residential xed investment per capita, quarterly ination, nominal short-term
interest rate, real house prices, hours worked per capita in the consumption-good and the housing
11To perform inference we discard the rst 10 per cent of observations.
12The same approach has been followed, among others, by Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani (2011).
13See, among others, Adolfson et al. (2007) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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sectors, and the nominal wage quarterly change in the consumption and housing sector.14 Real
variables are deated by the output implicit price deator in the non-farm business sector. We also
allow for measurement error in hours and wage growth in the housing sector. As in Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) we use quarterly data from 1965Q1. The desire to have a sample over which monetary
policy was conducted using conventional tools restrict us to consider data up to 2007Q4.15
3.3 Parameter Estimates
Tables 2 and 3 display the priors chosen for the models parameters and the standard deviations
of the shocks, as well as the posterior mean, standard deviations and the 95 percent probability
intervals. The posterior estimates of the models parameters feature a substantial degree of wage
and price stickiness, and a low degree of indexation in prices and wages in the consumption sector.
The estimated monetary policy rule features a moderate response to ination, a modest degree
of interest-rate smoothing, and a positive reaction to GDP growth. Finally, all shocks are quite
persistent and moderately volatile. News shocks display a much lower volatility than unanticipated
shocks.
We do not nd sizable di¤erences with respect to the estimates reported by Iacoviello and Neri
(2010). We nd a slightly higher response to ination and GDP growth and a lower response to
the lagged interest rate in the Taylor Rule as well as higher stickiness and lower indexation in the
Phillips Curve. These di¤erences are mainly related to revisions in the series for ination.16
3.4 Overall Goodness of Fit
In order to evaluate the importance of news shocks for the overall goodness of t of the model,
we compare the estimated model presented above against two other specications: without news





specication helps us to assess the potential importance of signal revisions.
Table 4 reports the log marginal data density of each model, the di¤erence with respect to the
log marginal data density of the model without news shocks, and the implied Bayes factor.17 Both
versions of the model that allow for news shocks display a signicantly higher log data density
14For details on the series used and the data transformations see the Appendix.
15The exclusion of the most recent years allows to understand housing market dynamics over the average business
cycle, i.e. not a¤ected by the period of extreme macroeconomic uctuations that characterized the recent nancial
crisis. A version of the model with the addition of a collateral shocks has been separately estimated. However, due
to the lack of data on debt and house holding of credit constraint households, we nd it di¢ cult to identify such a
shock and, thus, to capture the dynamics of the recent credit crunch.
16 Iacoviello and Neri (2010) used data from 1965Q1 to 2006Q4. Therefore, we use a di¤erent vintage of the data
set.
17Given that a priori we assign equal probability to each model, the Bayes factor equals the posterior odds ratio.
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compared to the no-news model. Accordingly, the Bayes factor indicates decisive evidence in favor
of the models with news shocks, see Je¤reys (1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995). In order for the
model without news to be preferred, we would need a priori probability over this model 1:7 1025
larger than the prior belief about the model with 4 and 8-quarter ahead news.18 Thus, we conclude
that the data strongly favor the inclusion of news shocks. Moreover, the model that also includes
longer horizon signals outperforms all other specications in terms of overall goodness of t.
All versions of the model are estimated using our updated data set. See Section 3.2. As a last
check, in the last three rows of Table 4 we report the Bayes factor using Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
data set. The same results hold.
4 Are News Shocks Di¤erent than Other Shocks?
In order to avoid concerns related to the identiability of news shocks, we test for local identication
in the model and in the moments. To circumvent the di¢ culty of explicitly deriving the relationships
between the deep parameters of the model and the structural characteristics of the model used to
estimate them, we use the local identication approach. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) we
rely on the methodology proposed by Iskrev (2010a). The analysis consists of evaluating the ranks
of Jacobian and can be performed for any given system of equations describing the linearized model
and the corresponding parameter space. The analysis strictly follows Iskrev (2010a and 2010b).
Let JT () be the Jacobian matrix of the mapping from the deep parameters of the model, ;
to the vector mT collecting the parameters that determine the unconditional theoretical moments





@ , where  represents a vector collecting the (non-constant elements of the) reduced-
form parameters of the rst-order solution to the model, @m@ measures the sensitivity of the moments
to the reduced-form parameters  ; and @@ measures the sensitivity of  to the deep parameters
. A parameter i is locally identiable if the Jacobian matrix
@J()
@i
has full column rank at i.19
Evaluating the Jacobian matrix @J()@ analytically, we nd that, in a neighborood of the posterior
mean of the estimated parameters, all parameters reported in Tables 2 and 3 are locally identied.20
A parameter is weakly identied if it is "nearly irrelevant", i.e. does not a¤ect the solution of the
model or the model implied moments, or it is"nearly redundant", i.e. if its e¤ect can be replicated by
other parameters. For completeness, in the following, we summarize the conditions for identication
both in the model and in the moments.
Identication in the model. Since  fully characterizes the steady state and the model
186:4 1012 larger than the prior belief about the model with 4-quarter ahead news shocks.
19We compute derivatives of the rst and second order covariances.
20For the analitical derivation of the Jacobian matrix, see the on line appendix to Iskrev (2010a).
12
dynamics, low sensitivity to a particular parameter means that this parameter is unidentiable in
the model for purely model-related reasons, thus unrelated to the series used as observables in the
estimation. If the Jacobian matrix @@ does not have full column rank, then some of the parameters
are unidentiable in the model. Strictly speaking, a parameter i is (locally) weakly identied in
the model if either (1)  is insensitive to changes in i, i.e. @@i ' 0, or (2) if the e¤ects on  of







Regarding the identication of the shocks, we measure collinearity between the column of the
Jacobian @@ with respect to the standard deviations of the news shocks, the standard deviation
of the unanticipated shocks and the autocorrelation parameters. Panel A of Figure 1 reports the
pairs of parameters with the highest value of the cosine among all possible combinations of shocks
parameters. First, the maximum value of the cosine across possible sets of shocks parameters
suggests weak collinearity relationships among these parameters with respect to the solution of the
model. Second, the highest collinearity is generally not found among the standard deviation of
the unanticipated component of the error term of a shock, "0x;t ; and the standard deviation of the
anticipated components of the same shocks, "4x;t 4 and "8x;t 8 . Thus, arguably, the unanticipated
and anticipated components of any shock do not play a similar role in the solution of the model.
In other words, examining how the identication of parameters is inuenced by the structural
characteristics of the model, we nd that both unanticipated and news shocks are identied in the
model.
Identication in the moments. Parameters that are identiable in the model could be
poorly identied if some of the variables are unobserved. On the other hand, it is important to
notice that if a parameter does not a¤ect the solution of the model ( @@i ' 0 ) then its value is also
irrelevant for the statistical properties of the data generated by the model (@J()@i ' 0). Indeed, the
statistical and the economic modelling aspects of identication are complementary. In the following
we test for local identication in the moments related to the ten observables used in the estimation.
Panel B of Figure 1 reports pairs of shocksparameters with the highest value of the cosine
among the columns of the Jacobian matrix, @J()@ . Once we evaluate the role of shocks in the
selected moments, we nd that collinearity is higher with respect to te model implied moments
than with respect to the model solution. It is important to highlight that while the identication
in the model only depends on the structural features of the model, the strength of idencation in
the moments depends on the number of observables and on the specic set of selected variables.
Overall, the e¤ect of unanticipated shocks in the moments is generally more similar to the 4-quarter
anticipated component of the same shock. The collinearity between the investment specic shock
and the 8 quarters ahead news shock o¤ers an exepction. The highest cosine is displayed between
the standard deviation of the housing preference shock and the persistence of the same shock.
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However, it is important to stress that no multicollinearity is found across parameters.
The relative importance of each shock in determining the models statistical properties for
the ten observables used to estimate the model, can be used as a measure of the strength of
identication. Figure 2 reports the sensitivity in the moments to the shocksparameters at the
posterior mean, i.e. the norm of columns of the Jacobian matrix, @J()@ ; corresponding to each of the
shocks parameters.21 News shocks display high sensitivity in the moments and are, thus, important
in determining the statistical properties of the model. This is particularly true for expectations of
investment specic shocks and changes in the ination target, both 4 and 8 quarters ahead, and for
8-quarters ahead expectations of cost push shocks. Unanticipated shocks generally display lower
sensitivity in the moments. Housing productivity shocks o¤er an exception.
Summarizing, all shocks are identied, though with varying strength of idencation. News
shocks appear to be distinguishable from unanticipated shocks both in terms of the solution of the
model and for the determination of the model implied moments of the ten observables used in the
estimation.
5 News Shocks and Housing Market Dynamics
In this section, we highlight key ndings regarding the transmission mechanism of news shocks and
quantify the role of news shocks for housing market dynamics. First, we analyze the contribution
of news shocks for uctuations of selected variables over the business cycle. Then, we assess their
role for the observed house prices booms and busts over the sample period.
5.1 Transmission Mechanism
The transmission of news shocks relies on two distinguishable features. First, news shocks can
induce optimism about future house price appreciation and generate hump-shaped dynamics in
house prices that resemble the patterns observed in the data during periods of housing booms.
Expectations about the occurrence of shocks that lead to an increase in house prices, such as a
future monetary policy loosening, an increase in the productivity of consumption goods or a decline
in the supply of houses, immediately generate beliefs of future appreciations in housing prices and
fuel current housing demand. Consequently, house prices gradually rise, peak at the time in which
expectations are fullled and, then, slowly decline towards the initial level. Thus, in contrast to
standard unanticipated shocks, the peak e¤ect on prices and quantities is not immediate. Figure 3
reports the e¤ect of unanticipated and news shocks on house prices.
21The norm is normalized by the value of each moment.
14
Second, news shocks generate the co-movement among house prices, consumption, residential-
and non-residential investment, and hours worked in both sectors of production observed in the
data, especially during periods of housing booms.22 Figures 4 and 5 report, respectively, the e¤ect of
selected unanticipated and the corresponding 8-quarters ahead news shocks on key macroeconomic
variables. News shocks a¤ect economic choices and, in particular, the housing and credit decisions
of households di¤erently than unanticipated shocks. As news spread, the value of housing collateral
increases and the rise in house prices is, thus, coupled with an expansion in household credit and
consumption. Moreover, due to limits to credit, Borrowers increase their labor supply in order to
raise internal funds for housing investments. Given the presence of adjustment costs for capital,
rms start adjusting the stock of capital already at the time in which news about the occurrence
of future shocks that come along with demand pressures in one of the two sectors spread. The
increase in business and housing investment makes also GDP rise. For the increase in investment
to be coupled with an increase in hours, wages rise. Thus, news shocks in this model generate
pro-cyclicality among all relevant variables.23
5.2 Business Cycle Fluctuations
Are news shocks a relevant source of business cycle uctuations? Table 5 shows the contribution of
the anticipated and unanticipated components of the shocks to the unconditional variance of the
observable variables at business cycle frequencies. News shocks account for slightly less than 40
percent of the variance in house prices, about 13 percent of the variance in residential investment,
and more than half of the variance of consumption, business investment, and ination. Expecta-
tions 8-quarters ahead account for most of the variations reported above. Regarding the di¤erent
types of news shocks, news related to cost-push shocks are by far the most important source of
uctuations among the anticipated shocks. See Table 6. In particular, expectations about future
cost push shocks explain slightly less than 30 percent of the variability in house prices, more than 40
percent of variations in consumption, business investment and ination, and have about the same
importance as news on productivity shocks for explaining residential investment. News shocks re-
lated to monetary factors are mainly driven by the persistent shock to the target of the central bank
and explain a bit more of variations in house prices and consumption than news of productivity
shocks. News shocks about productivity in the three sectors explain almost one-quarter of the vari-
ability in business investment. A plausible reason for the importance of news shocks is related to
22Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) document that, over the last three decades, housing prices boom-bust
cycles in the U. S. have been characterized on average by co-movement in GDP, consumption, business investment,
hours worked, real wages and housing investment.
23For a detailed analysis of the transmission mechanism of these shocks in the framework presented above, see
Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010).
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the fact that these shocks are able to generate co-movement among a broad set of macroeconomic
variables.24 See section 5.1. Since news shocks are an important source of uctuations in business
investment, along with consumption and house prices they contribute to the co-movement across
these variables.
Regarding the unanticipated component of the shocks, preference shocks have a considerable role
in explaining house prices and residential investment. This result is mainly driven by the housing
preference shock, which in the model resembles a housing demand shock. Housing preference shocks
have been previously documented in the literature as an important source of co-movement between
house prices and consumption in models of collateral constraints at the household level.25 However,
as highlighted by Liu, Wang ans Zha (2011), in the absence of credit frictions at the rm level,
preference shocks turn out to be not very important for business investment, and thus, contribute
little to the co-movement among house prices, consumption and business investment.
Monetary shocks explain a bit less than 10 percent of the variability in house prices and invest-
ment, and about 14 percent of the volatility of the other variables whereas, productivity shocks
explain around 30 and 10 percent of the variability in residential investment and house prices,
respectively. This latter result is mainly related to housing productivity shocks. Contrary to news
shocks, the unanticipated component of the cost-push shock is not among the main drivers of
uctuations.
Which unanticipated shocks loose importance once we introduce news shocks? To address
this question, we compare the role of the unanticipated shocks in the estimated model with news




x;t 8) against the estimated model without news shocks (ux;t =
"0x;t). See Table 7. In the model without news shocks, cost-push shocks are as important as
productivity and monetary policy shocks in accounting for the observed variability in house prices
and business investment. Cost-push shocks are also a main source of uctuations in consumption.
The introduction of news shocks as a source of uctuations signicantly reduces the importance
of unanticipated cost-push shocks and gives a predominant role to the anticipated component of
this shock. As for residential investment, consumption and business investment we also nd a less
sizable role for productivity and monetary factors. The importance of the unanticipated component
of all shocks is signicantly reduced for house prices.
24Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) document that, over the last three decades, housing prices boom-bust
cycles in the U. S. have been characterized on average by co-movement in GDP, consumption, business investment,
hours worked, real wages and housing investment.
25See, among others, Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Christensen, Corrigan, Mendicino and Nishiyama
(2009).
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6 Boom-Bust Cycles in House Prices
In this section, we quantify the contribution of di¤erent shocks to house price growth over boom-
bust episodes. To identify the main cycles in real house prices, we use the Bry-Boschan algorithm
with a one-year minimum criterion to dene a cycle phase. The peaks and troughs of the four
cycles identied with this method coincide with local maxima and minima of the real house price
series. See Figure 6. We report the results for the two main booms that peak in 1979Q4 and
2005Q4, respectively. Real residential investment displays co-movement with house prices during
the rst two decades of the sample. The peaks in residential investment anticipate the peaks in
house prices only by one quarter. In contrast, during the last two decades, the cycles of residential
investment and house prices are unsynchronized. House prices generally increase since the mid-
1990s to 2005Q3. In contrast, residential investment displays a di¤erent pattern and more closely
follow the U.S. economic cycle. Leading the NBER business activity peak by a few quarters, the
series displays a peak in 2000Q3, whereas the decline in housing investment ends in 2003Q1, a few
quarters after the through of activity. Thus, we also consider an alternative cycle for residential
investment peaking in 2000Q3, as identied by the Bry-Boschan algorithm.
Table 8 reports the contribution of the estimated shocks to house prices and residential in-
vestment growth during each boom- and bust-phase. Adding up the contribution of news and
unanticipated shocks we nd that: (i) cost-push shocks display a sizable contribution to the run
up in house prices and residential investment of the late 1970s; (ii) monetary and productivity
factors are found to be important for the subsequent bust; (iii) productivity accounts for more than
half of the increase in house prices and residential investment during the most recent period; (iv)
monetary factors signicantly contribute to the early bust-phase of the more recent cycle in house
prices; (v) housing preference shocks signicantly contribute to changes in house prices, whereas
the contribution of these shocks to changes in residential investment is not sizable.
Is there any role for news shocks during housing market booms and busts? Regarding the
relative importance of the anticipated and unanticipated component of shocks for changes in house
prices, news shocks contribute to the boom-phases, whereas the busts are almost entirely the result
of unanticipated monetary policy and productivity shocks. News shocks also sizably contributed
to changes in residential investment. See Tables 9 and 10.
News on cost-push shocks is found to be important for the run up in house prices and residential
investment during the boom of the late 1970s. In particular, expectations of cost-push shocks con-
tribute to around 30 percent of the run up in housing prices and 80 percent of residential investment
growth. Unanticipated productivity and monetary shocks mainly account for the subsequent bust.
It is worth highlighting that expectations of cost-push shocks signicantly contributed to housing
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market dynamics during the entire 1970s.26 News on cost push shocks is arguably related to ex-
pectations of oil price shocks. In fact, in 1973 and 1979 most of the industrialized nations, including
the U.S. experienced two major oil crises mainly on account of disruptions to energy supply. It is
common in DSGE models to explain the inationary pressures generated by the dramatic increase
in oil prices through cost push shocks.27 Once we allow for news on the cost push shock, we nd
that expectations about future inationary pressures were more important than current shocks in
determining agentshousing investment decisions during the high ination period of the 1970s. In
the next section we investigate the relationships between ination expectations, news shocks and
housing market dynamics.28
Supporting the idea of a productivity-driven economic expansion mainly related to expectations
of a "New Economy", investment specic news shocks were the main contributors to residential
investment growth during the second-half of the 1990s.29 Further, investment specic news shocks
together with expectations of downward cost pressures on ination account entirely for the sub-
sequent decline. Despite a more sizable role for the unanticipated component of productivity and
monetary policy shocks, news about productivity shocks in the housing sector and investment spe-
cic news shocks account together for about 20 percent of the increase in house prices over the
latest boom. The contribution of news about cost-push shocks also considerably muted the run up
in house prices over its entire boom phase.
Summarizing, expectation-driven cycles are mainly related to news regarding cost-push shocks,
shocks to productivity in the housing sector and investment-specic technology shocks. In contrast,
the contribution of the unanticipated component of the shocks is mainly related to monetary factors
and productivity in the two sectors of production.
7 Interpreting News Shocks: the Role of Expectations
Results presented above show that news about future cost-push, housing productivity, and invest-
ment specic shocks are important sources of housing market uctuations. Given that the e¤ect of
news shocks mainly works through expectations, we now investigate the importance of expectations
26As for the rst cycle of the early 1970s, news on ination and housing productivity together account for about
17 percent of the boom and 65 percent of the bust in house prices.
27De Graeve et al. (2009) relying on an estimated macro-nance model argue that the 1973 ination hike is attrib-
utable to wage and price-markup shocks. Several papers have documented the role of oil shocks for macroeconomic
developments in the 1970s. See, among others, the seminal work by Bruno and Sachs (1985). The impact of a change
in the price of oil has also been found to have decreased over time. See Blanchard and Gali (2009) and the references
therein.
28Regarding ination expectations and credit and real estate dynamics see also Piazzesi and Schneider (2010).
29See, among others, Jerman and Quadrini (2003) and Shiller (2000) for detailed account on productivity growth
driven by computer technology and the use of new equipment since the mid-1990s.
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for the transmission of news shocks to house prices. The assumption of nominal debt contracts
suggests a role for both ination and interest rates expectations in the housing and credit decisions










where t;t+j = ~
j uc;t+j
uc;t
is the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel and uh;t+juc;t+j is the marginal
rate of substitution between housing and consumption.30 Agents choose housing and consumption
goods such that the sum of the current and expected marginal rate of substitution between the
two goods, discounted by ~
j uc;t+j
uc;t
; is equal to the relative price of houses.31 Movements in the real
interest rate, i.e. the inverse of the pricing kernel, determine house price dynamics. Since debt
contracts are in nominal terms, expected ination a¤ects the debt decisions of the households and
also enters the optimality condition for housing investment. Lower expected real rates, through
either higher expected ination rates or lower interest rates, induce households to borrow more
and to increase their housing investment, therefore contributing to an increase in house prices and
credit ows.
We proceed in two steps. First, we quantify the contribution of news shocks to model-based
expectations and test the models ability to match survey-based expectations. Second, we explore
the linkages between agentsexpectations and house prices.
7.1 Survey- versus Model-based Expectations
Are news shocks related to agentsexpectations? Table 11 reports the variance decomposition of
the model-based expectations about ination and interest rates generated over the sample period.32
Ination expectations are mostly explained by the anticipated component of the cost-push shock
and the shock to the target of the central bank. In particular, news of future inationary shocks
explain around 50 percent of the variability in both 1- and 4-quarter ahead ination expectations,
with a predominant role for news shocks over longer horizon. Interest rate expectations are also
driven by news of ination targeting shocks and investment specic shocks. The importance of the
anticipated components of the investment specic shock is plausibly related to the GDP component
30Solving forward the lenders f.o.c. for housing it is possible to derive the equilibrium housing price equation (1),
where the discount factor is dened as ~GC (1  h).
31The house prices equation could alternatively be derived from the Borrowershousing demand. In this latter case
it would involve the lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint. In equilibrium both specication hold.
32The type of heterogeneity featured by the model does not imply heterogeneity in agents expectations. Both
types of agents have the same expectations about future ination and interest rates.
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of the interest-rate rule. In fact, investment specic news shocks are among the driving forces of
investment which itself represents a signicant share of GDP.33
As an alternative validation of the model, we assess the plausibility of the model implied ex-
pectations by relating them to survey estimates of expected ination and interest rates, which are
not part of the information set of the model.34 We measure observed ination expectations us-
ing the 1- and 4-quarter ahead expected GDP deator quarterly change estimated by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Alternatively, we also use
the expected change in prices from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.35 Interest
rate expectations are measured by the 1- and 4-quarter ahead expectations for the three-month
Treasury bill rate provided by the SPF. We nd that both ination and interest rates expectations
generated by the model are in line with the survey-based expectations. See Figure 7.
Next, we evaluate the information content of news shocks for the observed expectations on the
base of Granger causality tests. We focus on the news shocks that are more relevant to each type of
expectations generated by the model. The results of the test show that news shocks contain statist-
ically signicant information for all measures of observed ination and interest rate expectations.
See Tables 12 and 13.36 Thus, news shocks are found to be important in explaining model-generated
expectations about ination and interest rates. Further, they also contain signicant information
for survey-based expectations.
7.2 Expectations and House Prices
Next, we explore the relationship between expectations and house prices. The link documented
above between news shocks and agents expectations suggests an important role for both ina-
tion and interest rate expectations in house prices uctuations. Table 14 reports the correlations
between house prices and expectations over the observed boom and bust episodes. Survey based
ination expectations are strongly positively correlated with house prices during the boom-bust
cycle of the late 1970s. In contrast, the correlation becomes weaker during the more recent cycle.
Observed interest rate expectations are negatively correlated with house prices during the recent
boom and positively correlated during the bust-phase. See also Figure 8. One plausible reason for
the weaker co-movement of ination expectations and house prices during the more recent boom,
33Expectations on ination and interest rates are not among the observables used in the estimation.
34Previous papers that explore the ability of DSGE models to t the dynamics of ination expectations focus on
alternative assumptions regarding agentsinformation on the target of the central bank. See, i.e., Schorfheide (2005)
and Del Negro and Eusepi (2010).
35 In the Michigan survey, the question asked is "By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average,
during the next 12 months?". We use the mean of the responses to this question.
36The number of lags included in the tests was chosen based on the Akaike information criteria. The results are
however robust to the introduction of alternative numbers of lags.
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could be related to the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize both ination and ination
expectations since the mid-1980s. This could also explain the countercyclical behavior of interest
rate expectations during the latest house price boom. In fact, under more stable ination expecta-
tions, expected lower future real rates would be mainly related to expectations of a lower nominal
interest rate.37
As for the model-based expectations, ination expectations are positively correlated with house
prices during the boom-bust episodes, whereas the relationship between interest rate expectations
and house prices varies through time and became negative during the most recent period of run
up in house prices. See Table 14. By visual inspection, we can see that the expected interest
rate declined during the early phase of the more recent boom (2000Q3-2004Q1) and the trough in
interest rate expectations anticipate the peak in house prices.
Interest rate expectations in the model are mainly driven by the systematic component of the
policy rule. In fact, interest rate expectations seem to be strongly linked to expectations regarding
both ination and GDP growth as opposed to news about monetary policy shocks. The negative
correlation between house prices and interest rate expectations during the more recent booms is
explained by a decline in model-based expectations regarding GDP growth. In fact, during the
early phase of the more recent house prices boom that coincided with the 2001 recession period,
interest rate expectations decline given a deterioration of GDP growth expectations. See Figure 9.
Summarizing, the model performs reasonably well in capturing the relationship between ex-
pectations and house prices. In particular, it is able to match the co-movement between house
prices and ination expectations during the earlier cycles in housing prices and the counter-cyclical
behavior of interest rate expectations during the more recent boom.
8 Conclusions
This paper quanties the role of expectations-driven cycles for housing market uctuations in the
United States. Due to their ability to generate pro-cyclical and hump-shaped dynamics, news
shocks emerge as relevant sources of macroeconomic uctuations and explain a sizable fraction of
37Piazzesi and Schneider (2010) input survey-based expectations into an endowment model economy with nominal
credit and housing collateral and show that heterogeneous ination expectations induce disagreement about the real
rate and thus, turn out to account for the increase in credit volumes and the portfolio shift towards real estate during
the Great Ination of the 1970s. Our general equilibrium analysis abstracts from heterogeneity in expectations.
However, since the dynamics of the model are mainly driven by the borrowers, we can conjecture that allowing for
heterogenous expectations would not change our results. In fact, if, as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2010), the borrowers
are the ones who have higher ination expectations, then they will also perceive a lower real interest rate than the
lenders, and, thus, prefer to increase their demand for external funds as well as housing investment. In contrast,
the lenders, expecting higher real interest rates, would be willing to lend more. Thus, disagreement about the real
interest rate could potentially stimulate credit ows and exacerbate housing dynamics even further.
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variation in house prices and housing investment and more than half of the variation in consumption
and business investment. Housing productivity, investment-specic and cost-push news shocks, are
among the main sources of business cycle uctuations.
News shocks also signicantly contribute to booms and busts in housing prices. In particular,
expectations about cost-push shocks turn out to be an important factor during the booms of the
1970s while investment-specic shocks are more relevant after the 1980s. News shocks also turn
out to be important for ination and interest rate expectations that in the context of debt contracts
in nominal terms play a decisive role in agents decisions and thus house prices movement. Exploring
the link between news shocks and expectations, we nd that the estimated model e¤ectively captures
the relationship of house prices with higher ination expectations during the booms of the 1970s,
and with lower interest rate expectations during the more recent boom.
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In the following we describe in detail the data used in the estimation:
 Real consumption: Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally adjusted, billions of
chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Log-transformed
and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
 Business Fixed Investment: Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjus-
ted, billions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population.
Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
 Residential Investment: Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Log-
transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
 Hours Worked in Consumption Sector: Total Nonfarm Payrolls less all employees in the
construction sector times Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers divided the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population. Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
 Hours Worked in Housing Sector: All Employees in the Construction Sector, times Average
Weekly Hours of Construction Workers divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population.
Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
 Growth in Nominal Wage in Consumption-good Sector: Average Hourly Earnings of Produc-
tion/ Nonsupervisory Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls, Total Private. Demeaned.
 Growth in Nominal Wage in Housing Sector: Average Hourly Earnings of Production/ Non-
supervisory Workers in the Construction Industry. Demeaned.
 Real House Prices: Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold includ-
ing value of lot) deated with the implicit price deator for the nonfarm business sector.
Demeaned.
 Ination: quarter-on-quarter log di¤erences in the implicit price deator for output in the
nonfarm business sector. Demeaned.
 Nominal Short-term Interest Rate: 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market Rate),
expressed in quarterly units. Demeaned.
The data series as described above are shown in Figure A.1.
27











 Real non-residential investment






 Real residential investment




 Hours - consumption sector




 Hours - residential sector





-3 Wage growth - consumption sector





 Wage growth - residential sector





 Real house prices















The survey-based expectations data analysed in the paper are:
 Ination expectations: 1- and 4-quarter ahead expected GDP deator quarterly change es-
timated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters or,
alternatively, the expected change in prices from the University of Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers.38 Demeaned.
 Interest rate expectations: 1- and 4-quarter ahead expectations for the three-month Treas-
ury bill rate provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Demeaned.
These data are ploted in Figure A.2.
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Figure A.2: Survey based expectations
38 In the Michigan survey, the question asked is "By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average,
during the next 12 months?".
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
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Table 2: Estimation results
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Stdev Mean 5% 95%
Habits " B 0.50 0.075 0.3263 0.2469 0.4003
"0 B 0.50 0.075 0.6018 0.5009 0.6991
Investment adjustment costs k;c G 10 10.01 14.9672 11.4618 18.3434
k;h G 10 10.46 10.7674 6.6969 14.9466
Calvo prob. - prices  B 0.667 0.05 0.8997 0.8817 0.9181
Calvo prob. - wages cons. sector w;c B 0.667 0.05 0.8580 0.8170 0.8979
Calvo prob. - wages hous. sector w;h B 0.667 0.05 0.9020 0.8829 0.9215
Indexation - prices  B 0.50 0.20 0.0446 0.0058 0.0824
Indexation - wages cons. sector w;c B 0.50 0.20 0.0535 0.0056 0.0982
Indexation - wages hous. sector w;h B 0.50 0.20 0.4844 0.2442 0.7238
Cap. utilization adjustment costs  B 0.50 0.20 0.6840 0.5111 0.8622
Taylor rule - Smoothing rR B 0.75 0.10 0.6552 0.5946 0.7150
Taylor rule - Ination response r N 1.50 0.10 1.5654 1.4664 1.6624
Taylor rule - Output growth response rY N 0.00 0.10 0.8025 0.7066 0.9018
Autoregressive parameters
Prod. consumption sector AC B 0.80 0.10 0.9531 0.9289 0.9772
Prod. housing sector AH B 0.80 0.10 0.9970 0.9943 0.9997
Prod. capital sector AK B 0.80 0.10 0.9756 0.9593 0.9925
Preferences - housing j B 0.80 0.10 0.9454 0.9230 0.9672
Preferences - labor  B 0.80 0.10 0.9458 0.9213 0.9707
Preferences - intertemporal z B 0.80 0.10 0.8061 0.6121 0.9600
B=Beta, N=Normal, G=Gamma.
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Table 3: Estimation results (cont.)
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Stdev Mean 5% 95%
Stand. deviation - unant.shocks
Prod. consumption sector AC IG 0.001 0.01 0.0096 0.0086 0.0106
Prod. housing sector AH IG 0.001 0.01 0.0187 0.0162 0.0211
Prod. capital sector AK IG 0.001 0.01 0.0015 0.0002 0.0036
Preferences - housing j IG 0.001 0.01 0.0606 0.0431 0.0793
Preferences - labor  IG 0.001 0.01 0.0589 0.0339 0.0826
Preferences - intertemporal z IG 0.001 0.01 0.0107 0.0074 0.0138
Cost push p IG 0.001 0.01 0.0016 0.0010 0.0022
Monetary policy R IG 0.001 0.01 0.0031 0.0024 0.0036
Ination objective s IG 0.001 0.01 0.023910 2 0.017810 2 0.029910 2
Stand. deviation - ant. shocks 4-q
Prod. consumption sector AC4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010
Prod. housing sector AH4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0007 0.0002 0.0016
Prod. capital sector AK4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0006 0.0002 0.0010
Cost push p4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0008
Monetary policy R4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006
Ination objective*100 s4 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.025010 2 0.015610 2 0.034410 2
Stand. deviation - ant. shocks: 8-q
Prod. consumption sector AC8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0007 0.0002 0.0014
Prod. housing sector AH8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0040 0.0002 0.0103
Prod. capital sector AK8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0094 0.0069 0.0120
Cost push p8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0026 0.0019 0.0034
Monetary policy R8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0007
Ination objective*100 s8 IG 0.0035 0.02 0.032310 2 0.017410 2 0.047410 2
Stand. deviation - meas.errors
Hours worked - housing n;h IG 0.001 0.01 0.1445 0.1306 0.1587
Wages - housing w;h IG 0.001 0.01 0.0081 0.0071 0.0091
IG=Inverse Gamma.
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Table 4: Model Comparison
No news News 4 News 4&8
Benchmark (1965-2007)
Log Marginal Data Density 4809.49 4838.97 4867.60
Di¤erence - 29.48 58.11
Implied Bayes factor 1 6.41012 1.71025
I&N data (1965-2006)
Log Marginal Data Density 4693.44 4720.69 4743.11
Di¤erence - 27.25 49.67
Implied Bayes factor 1 6.81011 3.71021
Note: Log Marginal Data Density based on the Modied Harmonic Mean Estimator.
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Table 5: VarianceDecomposition: Anticipated vs Unanticipated Shocks
Anticipated Shocks Unanticipated Shocks
Total 4 -quarter 8-quarter Total
House Prices (Q) 36.62 1.20 35.42 63.38
Housing Inv. (IH) 12.59 0.52 12.07 87.43
Consumption (C) 54.84 1.65 53.19 45.16
Business Inv. (IK) 72.11 1.77 70.34 27.89
Ination () 63.36 10.62 52.74 36.63
Parameters set at the posterior mean; HP ltered series.
Table 6: Variance Decomposition
Anticipated Shocks Unanticipated Shocks
Production Cost Push Mon.Pol. Product. Cost Push Mon.Pol. Preferences
AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+
House Prices (Q) 3.62 28.52 4.48 10.42 0.70 9.27 42.99
Housing Inv. (IH) 5.18 5.29 2.12 33.43 0.15 9.51 44.34
Consumption (C) 4.22 44.65 5.97 3.41 0.76 13.95 27.04
Business Inv. (IK) 23.91 44.53 3.67 2.10 0.99 14.57 10.23
Ination () 1.33 45.19 16.84 2.19 10.09 13.61 10.74
Parameters set at the posterior mean; HP ltered series.
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Table 7: Variance decomposition: News vs No-News
Unanticipated Shocks
Model without News Model with News
Prod. Cost Push Mon. Pol. Prefer. Prod. Cost Push Mon.Pol. Prefer.
AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+ AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+
House Prices (Q) 13.84 14.16 14.70 57.30 10.42 0.70 9.27 42.99
Housing Inv. (IH) 48.89 2.19 8.63 40.30 33.43 0.15 9.51 44.34
Consumption (C) 7.89 30.43 33.70 27.97 3.41 0.76 13.95 27.04
Business Inv. (IK) 23.90 29.77 37.06 9.27 2.10 0.99 14.57 10.23
Ination () 1.23 81.72 10.74 6.31 2.19 10.09 13.61 10.74
HP ltered series.
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Table 8: Shocks Contribution to Booms and Busts
Booms and Busts Productivity Cost Push Mon. Pol. H. Pref.
dated based on Q % change AH+AC+AK UP UR+AS j
House prices (Q)
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 17.44 1.21 5.50 -1.03 14.81
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 -16.61 -8.62 10.82 -4.61 -11.79
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 20.53 14.09 -14.22 3.38 8.58
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 -8.72 -0.49 0.66 -3.18 -6.23
Res. investment (IH)
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 20.51 14.22 17.38 -3.37 2.23
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 -3.77 -1.49 18.60 -13.73 -1.14
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 25.29 28.84 -33.74 9.33 0.81
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 6.79 7.18 5.06 -8.55 0.61
dated based on IH
Res. investment (IH)
1992 Q1 - 2000 Q3 48.86 38.72 -11.81 4.03 -0.88
2000 Q4-2003 Q1 -25.65 -13.57 -10.84 -1.90 -0.20
2003 Q2-2007 Q4 12.81 11.70 -7.31 2.61 1.97













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Model-based Expectations: Variance Decomposition
Anticipated shocks Unanticipated
Total Cost Push (UP) Inf. Target (AS) Inv. Specic (AK) shocks
4-quarter 8-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter Total
Ination exp.
1 quarter ahead 72.19 1.64 49.27 10.21 9.13 27.78
4 quarter ahead 78.97 0.86 53.20 11.26 12.10 21.01
Int. rate exp.
1 quarter ahead 72.04 0.11 14.63 14.90 15.33 0.06 22.23 27.95
4 quarter ahead 80.38 0.05 7.42 18.78 27.14 0.01 23.62 19.65
Parameters set at the posterior mean.
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Table 12: Granger causality tests - Ination expectations
SPF Michigan Survey
1 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p -value F-statistic p-value
Cost-push (UP)
4 quarter ahead 6.8299 [0 .0000] *** 3.2492 [0 .0417] ** 15.743 [0 .0000] ***
8 quarter ahead 14.570 [0 .0000] *** 11.8680 [0 .0000] *** 31.954 [0 .0000] ***
The null hypothesis is that the shock does not Granger cause ination expectations.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance.
Table 13: Granger causality tests - Interest rate expectations (SPF)
1 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p -value
Cost-push shock (UP)
4-quarter ahead 20.569 [0 .0000] *** 11.603 [0 .0000] **
8-quarter ahead 19.380 [0 .0000] *** 8.431 [0 .0000] ***
Prod. K shock (AK)
4-quarter ahead 25.476 [0 .0000] *** 26.500 [0 .0000] ***
8-quarter ahead 30.842 [0 .0000] *** 51.915 [0 .0000] ***
Inf. Target shock (AS)
4-quarter ahead 15.685 [0 .0000] *** 4.451 [0 .0011] ***
8-quarter ahead 17.377 [0 .0000] *** 2.435 [0 .0928] *
The null hypothesis is that the shock does not Granger cause interest rate.
expectations. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance.
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Table 14: Expectations and House Prices
Correlation with House Prices
Survey-based Expectations (SPF) Model-based Expectations
Ination Interest Rate Ination Interest Rate
1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q
Booms and Busts Cycles
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 0.885 0.782 0.839 0.836 0.946 0.941
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 0.938 0.922 0.873 0.880 0.926 0.873 0.741 0.833
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 -0.356 -0.482 -0.551 -0.512 0.553 -0.101 -0.513 -0.333
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 -0.144 0.317 0.631 0.601 0.915 0.803 0.773 0.471
Overall
1970 Q4 - 2007 Q4 0.967 0.495 0.486 0.465 0.461 0.501
1980 Q1 - 2007 Q4 0.223 0.176 0.193 0.242























































































































































































































Panel B - Identication with respect to the model implied moments
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Figure 5: Impulse-Response Functions - 8-Quarter Ahead News Shocks
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Notes: Real house prices in deviations from trend. Red solid lines indicate peaks.
Figure 6: Real House Prices
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 Interest rate expectations 4 quarters ahead
Model
SPF
Red dashed lines indicate house prices peaks.
Figure 7: Model- vs Survey-Based Expectations
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Red dashed lines indicate house prices peaks.
Figure 8: Housing Booms and Expectations










Note: Red dashed line indicates the peak in house prices.
Figure 9: GDP Growth Model-based Expectations 1-quarter ahead
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